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 Ludger Kühnhardt 
Northeast Asia:                                     
Obstacles to Regional Integration 
The Interests of the European Union 
I. 
Northeast Asia is a paradoxical region. While its economic dynamism pro-
vides global stability, its geopolitical conflicts generate global uncertainty. 
No other region in the world is oscillating between a truly 21
st century aspi-
ration to define, master and promote globalization based on technological 
achievements and a 19th century type of geopolitical parameters coupled 
with an irritating set of “left-overs” from 20th century regime controversies 
over totalitarian rule and strategic antagonisms defined by the era of the 
Cold War. While a lot of energy has been spend to develop recommenda-
tions for viable mechanisms of regional integration in Northeast Asia –
including the valuable distinction between economic regionalism, political 
regionalism, and security regionalism
1 - much less attention has been given 
to an honest analysis of the obstacles to it. 
This effort must begin with a sober definition of the type of regional inte-
gration one has in mind. As for the European Union, regional integration 
means the supranational pooling of sovereignty, a law-based and politi-
cally-driven form of multi-level governance and an increasing political role 
 
1  See Christopher M. Dent, “Introduction: Northeast Asia – A Region in Search of 
Regionalism?”, Northeast Asian Regionalism. Learning from the European Experi-
ence, eds. Christopher M. Dent/David W.F.Huang, London: Routledge, 2002:1-15. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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based on the strength of a common market. Whether or not the European 
experience can or should be emulated elsewhere is, of course, a matter of 
debate. But to assess the conditions of Northeast Asia from a European per-
spective will always have this European experience in mind. European Re-
gional integration might follow contingent methods and goals. There is no 
one-dimensional logic of regional integration. But successful regional inte-
gration must be a win-win-situation for all its constituent members. Coop-
eration can bring together conflicting parties for a limited purpose and a 
precisely framed scope of common interests. Cooperation can become sus-
tainable, but it can also be dissolved after having achieved its goal or ex-
hausted its time. Integration requires the inner transformation of the con-
stituent members of an integration scheme in order to become viable and 
lasting. Integration requires the transformation from cooperation by choice 
to commonality by destiny. This has not happened in Northeast Asia yet. 
So far, Northeast Asia has remained outside the global trend of regional 
integration formation, along with the Greater Middle East. Both regions are 
light years apart as far as their socio-political, cultural and economic reali-
ties are concerned. But they are united in sharing the absence of noticeable 
and thorough efforts to establish forms and goals of regional integration. 
They are united in the obvious inability of bringing the countries of the re-
spective region together under the umbrella of a scheme of increasingly 
shared destiny and interest, commonality and joint outlook on the world at 
large. Northeast Asia is dominating the world’s headlines with impressive 
results of its economic dynamics: Japan, China and South Korea generated 
4 per cent of the world’s GDP in 1960, by 2005, together with Taiwan, they 
accounted for more than 20 per cent of the world’s GDP. Along with the 
ASEAN member states, their GDP matches that of the EU or the US. As 
for foreign-exchange reserves, Japan with 19 per cent, China with 11 per 
cent, Taiwan with 6.8 per cent , South Korea with 5.1 per cent and Hong 
Kong with 4.8 per cent of the global total are the five largest holders of for-
eign-exchange reserves in the world.    In the end, this alone will not over-
come the inherent competitive, if not confrontational character of the geo-
political constellation of the region. Economic cooperation is no panacea to 
resolve political contradictions and to overcome mistrust if it cannot be Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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transcended into a meaningful political and socio-cultural concept. It will 
finally be on the countries of Northeast Asia to decide under which type of 
order they want to live. Neither a shared identity nor shared consciousness 
as far as common merits of supranational order-building can be found in 
Northeast Asia yet. A sense of belonging to the region, however, is grow-
ing. For the time being, Northeast Asia can be characterized by “regionali-
zation without regionalism”.
2  
II. 
Usually, the geopolitical panorama of Northeast Asia is defined by evident 
political facts: the prevailing partition of the Korean peninsula; the danger 
of a North Korean atomic bomb; geopolitical tension between Japan and 
China over the primacy in Asia; conflicts over islands in the region that are 
symbolic for larger geopolitical rivalries (between China and Taiwan, be-
tween China and Vietnam, between Korea and Japan, between Japan and 
Russia): the future role of the United States as an Asian power and the US-
China relation; the prospects for Russian-Chinese relations, particularly 
regarding the exploitation of Siberian natural resources. Europe is by and 
large absent from these debates and yet the European integration experi-
ence is regularly invoked as a model that might be emulated in order to 
overcome the geopolitical impasses Northeast Asia is facing.  
Three fundamental obstacles to achieve regional integration can be identi-
fied in Northeast Asia beyond the usual short-term reflection on the matter. 
When the lens of studying Northeast Asia is elongated to take into account 
the historical legacy of the region, these three structural obstacles to re-
gional integration in Northeast Asia become evident:  
The ambivalence between self-induced action and external dependencies, 
including the relationship of Northeast Asian nations with Western powers  
 
2  Samuel S. Kim, “Northeast Asia in the Local-Regional-Global Nexus”. The Interna-
tional Relations of Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S. Kim, Lanham: Rowman & Little-
field, 2004: 13. 
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and the attitude of Northeast Asian nations vis-à-vis key notions of state 
philosophy that emanated from the West; 
The ongoing importance of categories of big power politics and balance of 
power strategies, including a traditional view on the relationship between 
war, national ambition and politics; 
The prevalence of structures and a mentality shaped by World War II and 
its aftermath, including continuous contradictions between regimes and 
governance methods and an obsession with territorial disputes and alliance 
loyalties based on zero-sum assumptions.  
Northeast Asia encountered the modern Western world in the 19th century 
as an intruding force. Missionaries, gun-boats, merchants with dubious 
practices – the first modern encounters of China, Japan, and Korea with 
Western powers were not at all amicable.
3 Russia’s advancement into Sibe-
ria added to the perception of an expansionist, if not aggressive outside 
world. All too often, the external forces were experienced as curse and not 
as asset. Northeast Asian nationalism is deeply rooted in anti-Western tra-
ditions. As modernization nationalism it was always focused on ways to 
meet the pressure from the West by improving and strengthening Northeast 
Asian cultures, people and countries. No matter the internal quarrels among 
the people and countries of the region, the overall skepticism against all 
external powers has been and still is a constantly present historical factor in 
the self-perception and development of Northeast Asia. The undisputed 
cultural centrality which China claimed for its position in the world (“Mid-
dle Kingdom”) was not really challenged by Japanese and Korean self-
perceptions, notwithstanding their own ambivalent, if not hostile attitude 
towards the Chinese during much of their mutual history. Interactions and 
struggles in the region were considered a matter of internal civilizational 
“family quarrel” while the encounters with the Western powers, Russia in-
cluding, were of an altogether different nature. In contrasting them, since 
the second half of the 19th century Northeast Asians countries felt their 
 
3  See David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Oversees 
Empires, 1415-1980, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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technological weakness while at the same time they were reassessing their 
cultural authenticity.  
European encounters with Northeast Asia during the 19th century were not 
all too different from the first presence of Americans and Russians in the 
region. The battle ships of US-Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in 1853 
at Edo Bay, forcing the Japanese Emperor to open trade with the US after 
more than two centuries of seclusion. The Japanese shogun accepted the 
trade concessions US-President Filmore had asked for: Shimoda and Hako-
date were opened for US commerce.
4 Less known abroad but having left no 
small imprint on the national psyche was the foreign effort to seek trade 
and to protect the growing catholic community in Korea during the second 
half of the 19th century.
5 After nine French priests had been killed and anti-
Catholic persecutions were still under way in Korea, the American mer-
chant ship “General Sherman” sailed up the Taedong River to Pyongyang, 
which he confused with Seoul at the Han River. The ship was burned and 
its crew killed in August 1866. In September 1866, the French Asiatic 
Squadron with seven warships entered Korean waters and prepared to at-
tack Seoul. They failed to do so because of Korean defense. In 1871, US-
Commander John Rodgers invaded Korea with five warships, attacking the 
fortifications on Kanghwa Ialand and returning to China only after fierce 
battles with the Koreans. In 1882, the US arranged peacefully for the open-
ing of Korea through a Treaty of Armistice and Commerce signed at Che-
mulp’o, today’s Incheon. The Hermit Kingdom was beginning to open to 
the West, followed by similar treaties with England and Russia in 1883 and 
France in 1886. Russian ways to enter Northeast Asia were no less radical 
and belligerent as those of the “Western” powers. From the time Russians 
had entered Siberia and reached the Amur River and the Pacific Ocean in 
the 17th century, they had tried to get access to Japan and Korea. After 
China had ceded the region around Vladivostok to Russia as part of the 
 
4  See Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan. The Story of a Nation, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1982 (3rd 
ed.): 107-136; Albert M. Craig: Japan: Tradition and Transformation, Tokyo: Tuttle, 
1981 (3rd ed.): 116-144.  
5  See Andrew C. Nahm, Introduction to Korean History and Culture, Elizabeth, 
NJ/Seoul: Hollym, 2004 (9th ed.):141-175.  Ludger Kühnhardt 
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overall external humiliation of China through unequal treaties, Russia be-
gan to project its interest into Korea and, through the construction of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, into Manchuria, clashing with the Japanese up un-
til Russia lost an outright war against Japan in 1905.
6  
As for China’s enforced opening to the West, the unequal treaties are leg-
acy: The Treaty of Nanking (1842) ended the First Opium War, forced 
China to cede Hong Kong to the British Empire and opened Canton, Amoy, 
Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai as treaty ports for Western ships. The 
Treaty of Aigun (1858) was signed by Imperial Russia and the Qing Em-
pire, establishing their border at the Amur River and thus the modern bor-
ders of Russia in the Far East. The Treaty of Tientsin (1858) between the 
Qing Empire, France, Russia and the United States opened eleven more 
Chinese ports to foreigners, permitting foreign legations in Beijing, allow-
ing Christian missionary activities and legalizing the import of opium. The 
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) between China and Japan ended the Chi-
nese-Japanese War and with it Chinese suzerainty over Korea while it 
brought the cession of Taiwan to Japan. The Convention of Beijing (1860) 
between the British Empire and the Qing Empire forced China to cede the 
Kowloon Peninsula and Hong Kong “in perpetuity” to the British Empire 
and parts of Outer Manchuria to Russia. The Treaty of 1901 between China 
on the one hand, the US, the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, France, the 
German Empire, Italy, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Belgium, Spain and 
the Netherlands on the other hand was signed after China’s defeat in the 
Boxer Rebellion by the Eight Power Expeditionary Force. The Twenty-One 
Demands (1915), finally, secured temporary Japanese hegemony over 
China under the pretext of Japan’s Declaration of War against the German 
Empire in 1914.
7 
A belligerent pursuit of interests, the inclination to dominate and a certain 
Western attitude of humiliation left no positive image of the outside world 
among many people in 19th century Northeast Asia. Of course, Northeast 
 
6  See John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1994. 
7  See John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of 
Treaty Ports 1842-1854, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.  Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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Asian relations with Europeans and with Americans in the 19th century 
also included elements of mutual respect and cooperation. But all in all, the 
West was perceived as inclined to dominate while one’s own society was 
recognized as weak and still lacking modernization. The Meiji Restoration 
in Japan (1867/1868) and the dethronement of the Chinese Emperor (1911) 
were unrelated symptoms of the same commonly shared desire to pursue an 
aggressive policy of self-induced modernization in order to protect one’s 
own tradition and society from falling under Western dominance. While the 
West began to colonize the world, Northeast Asian nations started a period 
of self-colonization and self-improvement that subsequently triggered ag-
gressive modernization nationalism and bilateral struggles for dominance 
in the region. The latter one was most notable in the relationship between 
China and Japan, which became an imperial power itself, in that regard 
closer to Western powers than to the behavior of its Northeast Asian 
neighbors: Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895, Korea in 1910. In 
contrast, Russia’s role in Northeast Asia was not only one of an external 
threat. For instance, Korea was seeking Russian assistance against the in-
creasing Japanese intrusion after the Japanese defeat of China in 1895. The 
same, of course, became true for the US protection of Japan and South Ko-
rea after World War II and throughout the Cold War: America, formerly an 
imperial power in Northeast Asia, became the embodiment of liberty. 
Cultural pride and self-protection went hand in hand with the emergence of 
a distinct Northeast Asian modernization nationalism. Western technologi-
cal devices as well as Western concepts of modern statehood were adopted 
whenever they helped to strengthen and protect the peoples of Northeast 
Asia from being dominated by Western powers. This became a genuine 
feature of the relationship between Northeast Asia and the West, unlike the 
relationship between Western powers and other regions of the world. This 
structure of encounter and the reaction to it did, however, not include the 
recognition of any of the external powers as a well-respected and widely 
recognized “Asian power”. To this day, neither Russia nor the United 
States or Europe and any of its leading countries are recognized as “natural 
Asian powers” in Northeast Asia. As for Russia, efforts to develop a trian-
gular regional project with Chinese, North Korean and Russian participa-Ludger Kühnhardt 
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tion indicate the potential.
8 But in contrast to these plans, the factual de-
population of Russia’s Far East has become noticeable since the end of the 
Soviet Union: Some scholars have assumed a drop of Russians in the Far 
East down to 7.2 million and warned that over 100 million Chinese in 
Northeastern China might seek “relief from overcrowding”.
9 Like the US, 
Russia maintains strategic interests and advanced positions in Northeast 
Asia to this day. Fully respected Asian powers they have not become how-
ever. It is indicative that the promotion of a cultural sphere of communica-
tion in Northeast Asia by the Korean President in 2004 did not make refer-
ence to Russia, after all an immediate neighbor of Korea, let alone the US, 
continuously the provider of security and stability in South Korea and for 
Japan with more than 100.000 soldiers deployed in Northeast Asia. The 
sense of gratitude towards the Americans is disappearing even in places 
where since the outbreak of the Cold War freedom was absolutely depend-
ent of their protection, such as in South Korea. While the American role in 
supporting or even providing liberty in Northeast Asia is not forgotten, it is 
also recalled that the US participated in gun-boat politics and enforced 
policies of open doors in the second half of the 19th century across the re-
gion, at the time not being different from European imperial practices in 
Northeast Asia. Disputes over the US-led “War on Terrorism” have rein-
forced a sense of silent drifting apart between the US and new generations 
during the early years of the 21st century, even in the traditionally most 
loyal countries of the region (Japan, South Korea). 
Northeast Asia begins to reflect about cultural commonality, but it does so 
with the explicit exclusion of those external powers that have become key 
actors in the geopolitics of Northeast Asia for most of the last two centu-
ries.
10 Although in reality the US has been an Asian power at least since 
 
8  See the “Tumen River Area Development Programme.” <www.tumenprogramme. 
org> 
9  Gilbert Rozman, “Russian Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia”. The International 
Relations of Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S.Kim, op.cit.: 215. 
10  An international conference in 2004 under the auspices of the Korean President’s 
project for the formation of a Northeast Asian Cultural Community for Peace and 
Prosperity brought together representatives from China, Japan and Korea, but no 
thought was spend on the Northeast Asian role of either the US or of Russia: Korea Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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World War II, it is facing various efforts of selective exclusion from the 
formation of regional Northeast Asian arrangements, notably from a possi-
ble ASEAN enlargement. The tendency to limit US strategic influence in 
Northeast Asia coincides with an interesting reversion of the cultural and 
geopolitical reassessment of China and its global role: No longer consider-
ing itself the “Middle Kingdom”, China has begun to impressively awaken 
after a long century of internal turmoil in full recognition of its role as an 
Asian, that is to say a Northeast Asian country. Chinese universalism seems 
to transcend into a new Chinese sense of regionalism. As a consequence of 
continuously high growth rates of its economy since the beginning of re-
forms under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has risen from thirteenth place 
among world trading nations to rank five (if the EU is counted as a single 
bloc to rank four after the US, Canada, the EU and Japan). China accounts 
for around one fifth of the growth in world trade during the early years of 
the 21st century. While 75 per cent of all investment in China is of foreign 
origin, in 2002 China surpassed the US as the world’s leading destination 
for foreign direct investment, “absorbing nearly $53 billion”.
11 By 2010, 
China is projected to receive $100 billion foreign direct investment. Politi-
cally, it is obvious that China has opted for a “selective support of regional 
initiatives”
12 and as far as international and multinational fora are con-
cerned, China has “moved from virtual isolation from international organi-
zations to membership numbers approaching about 80 percent of those of 
the major industrialized states, and around 160 percent of the world aver-
age”.
13 China’s genuine revisionism since the early 1980s has not been 
revolutionary, but inclusionist and thus stabilizing global order-building. It 
 
Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences (ed.), The Policy Study Ses-
sion for the Formation of the Northeast Asian Cultural Community for Peace and 
Prosperity. Proceedings of the International Conference, Seoul: Korean Research 
Council for Humanities and Social Sciences, 2004. 
11  Thomas G. Moore, “China’s International Relations: The Economic Dimension.” 
The International Relations of Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S. Kim, op.cit.: 106 
12  Ibid.:129. 
13  Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s International Relations: The Political and Security 
Dimension”. The International Relations of Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S.Kim, 
op.cit.: 67. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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is indicative for things to come that China is doing so as an Asian country 
and no longer under the claim of autarkic Chinese universalism.  
Some pre-modern concepts of politics prevail in Northeast Asia as part of 
its legacy of encountering external powers as force of subjugation: the pri-
macy of national sovereignty aspiration; the syndrome of balance of power 
equations; in the Chinese (as in the American!) case the continuous rele-
vance of war as a category of conflict-resolution, and in the case of South 
Korea the realistic fear of a continuation of exactly such a pattern of behav-
ior on the side of North Korea; a zero-sum mentality as far as status, influ-
ence and power of any of the regional or external actors is involved; as its 
consequence the assumption that regional cooperation must not curtail 
autonomous freedom to act and that regional integration might undermine 
the latter while distinctively devaluate national sovereignty as the prime 
source of national political autonomy and pride. External actors are inevi-
table partners in the pursuit of the globalization-related goals of the coun-
tries of Northeast Asia (modernization and mastering globalization in order 
to strengthen the nation and its role in the region and the world) while they 
remain suspicious as far as the scope of national action and autonomy of 
the region as a whole are concerned. Among themselves, however, the 
Northeast Asian nations tend to pursue policies of competition in the eco-
nomic sphere with astuteness and focus as if traditional national rivalries 
have been transferred from the sphere of politics to that of the economy. 
Largely competitive economic structures and ambitions make one wonder 
whether or not cooperative, let alone integrative political approaches could 
ever be accommodated in such an environment. 
The logic of big power politics prevails in Northeast Asia. Big power poli-
tics is based on the autonomous pursuit of power as prime category of in-
ter-state relations and is intended to maximize one’s own power at the ex-
pense of the other countries in the region. The attitude of big power politics 
can also be exercised by small countries as it is defined by the prevalence 
of a zero-sum-mentality: My neighbors gain is my own inevitable loss. 
Strategies of balance of power are defined as efforts to gain an equilibrium 
of power equations or a freeze of power struggles in a specific region. Un-
der conditions of the attitude of big power politics, strategies of balance of Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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power are the best possible approach to tame this attitude of big power 
politics. But strategies of balance of power cannot reverse the logic of 
weakness, unraveling and destruction that is inherent in balance of power 
relations. Northeast Asia’s countries have adopted the logic of big power 
politics from Western models, long outdated by now in the West. In North-
east Asia, however, big power politics and strategies of balance of power 
have been internalized as the only guarantee to national sovereignty and a 
respectable regional and international status. Big power politics has be-
come a reflex in Northeast Asia’s struggle for independence and national 
sovereignty. It has been reinforced and overlapped by the experience with 
the Cold War antagonisms pertinent to Northeast Asia: The antagonism 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the antagonism between 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and the antagonism 
between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union have all left 
their mark on the mindset and mentality of policy actors and public opinion 
in Northeast Asia. Most of the region’s indigenous conflicts of the second 
half of the 20th century have been a function of the Cold War paradigm. 
Northeast Asia’s geopolitical constellation has evolved from a conundrum 
of colonial and decolonizing (that is to say nationalistic) elements, ideo-
logical rivalries and Cold War parameters, and finally from internal power 
ambitions and struggles for hegemony. Northeast Asia’s big power mental-
ity coincides with a traditional notion of warfare as a means of politics. 
Neither China nor the USA has abandoned the idea that war can serve a 
function to resolve conflicts. Divided Korea continues to live in the shadow 
of war and the presence of US soldiers across the country is indicative for 
the fact that in the end of the analysis, World War II will not end as long as 
the Korean armistice is executed in Pammunjon with an almost archaic 
precision. The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, stating that “in due 
course Korea shall become free and independent” is still unfulfilled prom-
ise to half of the Korean peninsula.
14 The Korean War (1950-1953) can be 
 
14  Cited in Andrew C.Nahm, Introduction to Korean History and Culture, op.cit.: 213: 
See this book also for an account of the path that lead from Japanese colonial rule 
to Soviet occupation and subsequent partition under an American plan to limit So-
viet influence on the Korean peninsula:213-256. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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considered a prolongation of World War II in Northeast Asia, not being 
overcome in its geopolitical consequences to this day. North Korea keeps 
on playing with the effects of the threat of warfare looming over a region 
that it might be able to (relatively) hold hostage with nuclear arms. Japan, 
in turn, has revoked warfare, but has not properly recognized its own role 
as perpetrator in bringing about much of today’s geopolitical constellation 
of Northeast Asia (including the rise of Communism in China and both 
communism and nationalism in Korea with the subsequent division of the 
Korean peninsula). Instead, Japan prefers to be perceived as victim of 
World War II (atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and strives for 
renewed global recognition in the shadow of the US-China rivalry: A Japa-
nese culture of shame meets its neighbor’s expectation of responsibility 
towards past victims. This pattern could limit Japan’s ambition to join the 
UN Security Council as China – already a permanent member of the Secu-
rity Council with veto power – does not intend to revoke or curtail its own 
plan to become also the leading Northeast Asian economic power. Thus, 
China uses means of controlled provocation against Japan in order to define 
the limits of Japan’s scope of action on the global stage. All of this stems 
from the logic of big power politics and is not conducive for a climate of 
reality-transforming integration. 
What holds true for the geopolitical constellation of Northeast Asia is only 
reinforced by the region’s geo-economic development: The highly dynamic 
economies of Northeast Asia are by and large structured along the limiting 
principle of competition and hardly along the mutually advantageous prin-
ciple of complementarity. While this guarantees national focus in each 
country and impressive success in global markets, it does not automatically 
support interconnectedness and the ability to share one’s potential for the 
sake of higher means of cooperative gains. Although indications might 
point to inherent trends of business-to-business cooperation across national 
boundaries and loyalties, Northeast Asia still has to prove the advantage of 
comprehensive patterns of complementarity in the name of regionalism, 
with both an economic and a political implication. 
3. The experience of World War II and the Cold War has not reduced, but 
rather reinforced the sensitivity for national sovereignty in Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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War and Cold War experiences overlapped with the genuine struggle for 
national independence against Japanese colonial domination. Although the 
remaking of order in Northeast Asia includes Japan beyond the empire’s 
dark legacy of promoting a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under 
its control, suspicion against Japanese claims to hegemony have not van-
ished. Even stronger than this suspicion is the fervor across the region to 
defend national sovereignty based on the status quo established after 1945. 
This has almost turned out into an obsession as far as the pending territorial 
disputes in the region are concerned. It can hardly be understood elsewhere 
in the world why a chain of seemingly irrelevant islands – from Sakhalin to 
Dokto, from Taiwan to the Spratley Islands – remain at the center of terri-
torial disputes across the region. In Northeast Asia, the island issues do 
play the same role as contested border-regions did during most of Europe’s 
19th and 20th century history: these islands are not considered mutual 
bridges between neighboring countries, but rather barriers and trophy’s in 
each countries claim to regional power status. 
Bitter disputes in interpreting history and historical justice are resurging in 
Northeast Asia with almost predictable repetition. They indicate ongoing 
mistrust that is not only rooted in today’s claims of status and power. This 
mistrust is rooted in historical differences, disputes and contradictions that 
have been constitutive for the emergence of modern Northeast Asia. Most 
notable among a set of legacies of mistrust is the one stemming from re-
gime antagonism prevailing in Northeast Asia to this day. Japan is consid-
ered by its critics as the disguised prolongation of imperial attitudes that 
did not vanish from the Japanese political culture with the US-imposed 
democratic development after 1945. Yet, nobody can deny the strength of 
modern Japan, accounting for 67 percent of Northeast Asia’s GDP.
15 South 
Korea considers itself the authentic moral leader in pursuit of democratic 
values having struggled for them against external colonial imposition and 
internal military rule. By now, it has also become the tenth biggest econ-
omy in the world.  
 
15  Thomas Berger,”Japan’s International Relations: The Political and Security Dimen-
sions.” The International Relations of northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S.Kim, op.cit.: 
135. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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The People’s Republic of China, after all, prevails as a communist country 
with a one-party system and human right abuses, no matter its impressive 
economic modernization. North Korea, under China’s protective umbrella 
and neutralizing control, is the modern version of a hermit kingdom, and in 
fact has evolved as the most secluded totalitarian state with a high degree 
of Orwellian characteristics and horrifying features of brain-washing. Its 
GDP in 2000 amounted to $17 billion, “a tiny faction of South Korea’s 
$455 billion”.
16 Taiwan considers itself the “right China” because of its 
democratic record. Yet, Taiwan is increasingly drawn back towards 
mainland China because of its magnetic modernization attraction: Taiwan-
ese capital ranks second as source of foreign direct investment in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. By now, one million Taiwanese are living in 
mainland China, 300,000 in Shanghai alone, and more than half of Tai-
wan’s top hundred companies have investments in the People’s Republic. 
Communist ideology and fear of violent Chinese annexation seem to in-
creasingly be overtaken by a sense of national unity, recalling a long cul-
tural and a rather shorter political tradition of unity (only from 1683 until 
1895, Taiwan was under Chinese rule, being a prefecture of Fujian). 
Russia, finally, has been so much absorbed by its internal political and 
socio-economic turmoil since the demise of the Soviet Union that it hardly 
has been able to project any promising image, let alone a role-model for 
emulation to any of the Northeast Asian countries. The proclamation of a 
Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship in 2001, “representing to all appear-
ances the best relationship between these two territorially imposing 
neighbors in nearly fifty years”
17, cannot reverse the decline of Russia’s Far 
East although China has become the biggest customer of Russian weap-
onry, largely produced in the country’s Far East. The People’s Republic of 
China began to purchase Russian weaponry in 1990 after the US and the 
EU imposed an arms sale boycott against China, following the Tiananmen 
Square massacre. For the period 2000 to 2005, the Chinese arms sale from 
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Russia alone was expected to be worth $5-6 billion.
18 Yet, Russia’s overall 
decline and crisis of political culture has not enabled the country to main-
tain its power projection in Northeast Asia. In fact, it has even brought 
Mongolia closer to Northeast Asia, considering itself a successful model of 
post-communist democratic transformation while redirecting its cultural 
focus towards China and curtailing its ties with Russia. 
Such is the panorama of Northeast Asia as a region of excessive contradic-
tion as far as regimes, governance and political culture is concerned. Under 
the impression of Northeast Asia’s role for economic globalization, the re-
gime component and the impact of political culture seems often to be un-
derrated in the analysis of the region. But how can one expect shared des-
tiny under the umbrella of a scheme of pooled sovereignty as long as the 
political systems and their underlying political culture are so fundamentally 
different? During the decades of Europe’s division, it would not have 
served any purpose to only invoke common cultural traditions while deny-
ing the divisive character of antagonistic regimes. As much as culture was 
connecting Poland and Portugal, Hungary and Ireland, Sweden and Slova-
kia, it would have been inconceivable for the European Community to rec-
ognize any Central and Eastern European communist state as its member in 
the absence of democracy, rule of law and market economy. As integration 
is not only about markets, but primarily about shared legal norms and de-
mocratic values, nobody with the faintest idea about the differences in po-
litical regimes, constitutional and governance structures and in the underly-
ing political cultures of Northeast Asia’s countries should be astonished 
about the absence of integration mechanisms in this region. In the end, the 
absence of regional integration in Northeast Asia is a matter of normative 
and systemic differences and not a function of the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 or any other economic fact.  
 
18  Ibid.:339. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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III. 
It is stimulating to reflect about the potential for cultural commonality in 
Northeast Asia capable of transcending historical legacies and fears, geopo-
litical antagonisms and scars and prevailing political contradictions and 
struggles for economic leadership. The Confucian tradition among the peo-
ple of “chopstick cultures” should not be underestimated across the region. 
It stimulates discipline and work ethic, mercantilism and deep sympathy for 
material progress, service orientation and focus on education, long-term 
perspective and respectful loyalties. Amidst modern Northeast Asian coun-
tries, traditions are revitalized while the dynamics of globalization might 
blur such trends as merely folkloric. Northeast Asia is reconsidering the 
value of tradition, heritage and authenticity amidst booming mega-cities 
and ever speedier technological achievements: South Korean President Roh 
Moo-Hyun has even launched a presidential initiative with this specific 
mandate. Yet it is unclear if and how - and by whom - cultural traditions or 
trends could be translated into political strategies for region-building. A 
comparative perspective of the European experience provides only limited 
inspiration in this effort: Most analysts in Northeast Asia would consider 
such comparison as an overly constructivist approach, which contrasts with 
their deeply rooted pragmatism (and pride). Yet, it is worth reflecting about 
some comparable matters.  
Among the many legends about European integration one can find the fol-
lowing story: When Jean Monnet, one of the important founding fathers of 
European integration, was reflecting about the path towards integration, he 
is said to have argued that if he would do it all over again he would start 
with culture. No evidence in his statements can be found for this quota-
tion.
19 Often reference to the alleged sentence of Monnet is used to criticize 
European integration for not having achieved a sufficient degree of popular 
legitimacy. It is questionable whether or not European integration is lack-
ing legitimacy and it is even more questionable whether or not Europe 
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would have been able to achieve a higher degree of legitimacy if the inte-
gration process would have started with culture. It is doubtful whether this 
could have happened in the 1950s. The main reason: Culture is so impor-
tant to Europeans. Aside of being important, one could conclude a cultural 
history of the people of Europe by way of saying that what they all have in 
common is the fact that they are different from each other. Shortly after the 
horrendous World War II, in which 18.500 Europeans were killed on aver-
age per day by other Europeans, mistrust and cultural suspicion were as 
prevailing in Europe as the hope to overcome the deadly vicious circle of 
antagonistic and clashing nationalism, the inclination of cultural sentiments 
of superiority and, may be even more so, prejudicial cultural perceptions of 
one another.
20 Therefore, it turned out to be right and far-sighted to begin 
European integration with the Community of Coal and Steel, and subse-
quently with the development of a Common Market. It was the right thing 
because at the end, it also transformed cultural relations in Europe.
21 But it 
did transform cultural relations in Europe only because the integration 
process was thoroughly based – from day one – in the creation of a supra-
national community. It was based on the concept of a steady transfer of na-
tional sovereignty to the European level, based on the concept of a suprana-
tional community of law that was increasingly growing into a parliamen-
tary democracy.  
Europe’s struggle for the first ever European Constitution communication 
testifies to the growth of a community of cultural communication, based on 
mutual recognition of cultural diversity and based on the understanding that 
European integration is a process toward a common political identity with-
out undermining the cultural diversity of its people. In fact, European inte-
gration preserves the cultural diversity among its constituent parts through 
its common political identity. The process has not been completed and it 
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remains full of flaws and contradictions. But in spite of all the idiosyncra-
sies of European governance and European policy-formulation, the Euro-
pean Union is nowadays considered the political expression of Europe. It 
provides the frame for the further and stable evolution of cultural commu-
nication. It must be questioned whether Europe would have been capable to 
achieve this the other way around, that is to say by starting with culture, 
when the notion of cultural primacy or culture-based prejudice was still so 
prevailing across Europe. 
Cultural communication under the umbrella of political integration has 
found different expressions, not all of them logically consistent. Yet they 
work.
22 Take the institutions of the European Union. 20 official languages 
are recognized in the EU, interpreters of all of them find jobs in the Euro-
pean Parliament and in the European Commission. Every directly elected 
member of the European Parliament can contribute to the deliberations in 
this parliament in his or her mother tongue. This will always remain so be-
cause it is the recognition of linguistic cultural diversity in Europe that pro-
duces legitimacy. Europe is only stable if an Estonian feels as much at 
home as a British or a Portuguese or a Maltese. This feeling is by and large 
deeply enshrined in the ability to speak one’s mother tongue in common 
institutions. On the other hand, the working languages in the European 
Commission, the European Council and the European Court of Justice are 
for practical purposes limited to English, French and German, the three 
languages spoken by most members of the European political elite. One 
might contemplate whether this list could or should be enlarged to include 
Spanish and Polish. It is doubtful whether this would be of much help as far 
as the function of working procedures in the mentioned European institu-
tions is concerned. Decisions of the European Council, and more so of the 
ever more important European Court of Justice might be pronounced in two 
or three languages only and yet Europe will remain confronted with 20 dif-
ferent interpretations because an argument, a phrase, even a word can have 
20 different meanings in the legal or political context of all member states. 
A community of cultural communication recognizes this fact and starts to 
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interpret the prevailing differences on the basis of a community spirit that 
supports commonality and not dissociation. That is the European experi-
ence, no matter how insufficient it remains to be.  
The result of a comparative study on the prevailing differences of mentali-
ties in Northwestern Europe that is to say in the region of Belgium, Lux-
emburg, the Netherlands and Germany’s North-Rhine-Westphalia is tell-
ing: This is one of the most powerful economic areas of the European Un-
ion. It is also its most densely populated industrial zone and it is considered 
to be one of the cultural centers of the European Union. Yet, cultural dif-
ferences remain startling and business people who tend to think that their 
counterpart across the no longer existing border behaves in the same way 
he or she does will often be mistaken.
23 While in French-influenced re-
gions, you do informal business negotiations over an extensive lunch with 
good wine, the Anglo-Saxon habit would rather be to grab a sandwich and 
then sit down formally to talk business in a serene atmosphere with bottled 
water. Differences also exist – to give another example - as far as invita-
tions among business partners into private homes are concerned. Even if 
you are invited to the home of a business partner, do you bring flowers for 
the lady of the house or not? And when do you leave again after a nice 
evening? The answers collected in a “mentality guide” for Northwestern 
Europe demonstrate one fundamental insight into the evolution of Europe 
as a Union of cultural communication: Differences prevail even among the 
closest of neighbors and in fact even within single countries.
24 Managers of 
companies with, let’s say, joint French and German ownership have to or-
ganize retreats to deal with problems of cultural communication among 
themselves. This relates to mentality differences impacting business behav-
ior and to contrasting expectations and perceptions of business procedures 
of their partner. But all these differences have largely become differences 
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in mentality. They are no longer differences in identity, quickly escalating 
into disputes over principles, pride and prejudice.  
This is also one of the startling discrepancies that exist to this day between 
integrated Europe and the remaining regions of Europe: While in Luxem-
burg or Amsterdam, the matter might be one of different mentalities over 
business habits, in Kosovo the matter has escalated into life and death. 
Identity is prevailing wherever you travel South Eastern Europe. By and 
large it does still exist in most of the other post-communist societies that 
joined the European Union on June 1, 2004. Wherever you ask people in 
Central and South Eastern Europe about themselves and their ethnic, lin-
guistic or religious neighbors, they will tell you “We are different”, mean-
ing “We are special”. After five decades of integration, in those societies of 
the European Union that have gone through the long and still unfinished 
process of political transformation – and most importantly that is to say the 
process of transforming their political culture – the answer you will get 
most likely will be “We live different” or “we do business in different 
ways” or “We eat different food”. Men are what they eat – that might be an 
anthropological fact. But men do not need to antagonize each other and to 
built walls around their diverse habits and attitudes, norms and traditions, 
that is a European experience. 
What has the European Union actively done to promote cultural communi-
cation? First of all, it can do only little, according to the Treaty provisions 
constituting the European Union as a union of law. The most remarkable 
trend has been one of indirect appreciation for culture and its related 
sphere, namely education. In the past, even the idea that the European Un-
ion might touch upon matters of education was considered a taboo. Most 
EU member states see autonomy over education structures and content as 
one of the holy ingredients of their national rights. When the European Un-
ion seriously prepared its strategy for globalization at the 2000 Lisbon 
European Council meeting of heads of state and government it also discov-
ered the importance of education. Improving the structures and the quality 
of education was recognized as a priority in order to adapt European soci-
ety and economy to the challenges and opportunities of globalization. This 
might be a highly functional perspective on education as our children de-Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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serve the best education for their own sake. But at least it increased the 
European Union’s awareness for education. 
As part of the strategy for globalization, the EU introduced a new mecha-
nism of pursuing its goals: “Open coordination”. This mechanism is in-
tended to prevent resistance from the side of individual member states of 
the EU to comply with EU goals as it is a much softer way of governing 
than the rigid form of strictly imposed EU regulations. Based on the notion 
of “open coordination”, the European Commission has developed standards 
for bench-marking in the field of education. In fact, the relevant “Director-
ate General” of the European Commission – sort of a EU Ministry for Edu-
cation and Culture – has become the center of interest and attention ever 
since. Comparing the quality of education standards across the European 
Union has only begun. But it will foster education reforms and make the 
EU’s education structures step by step more competitive in the age of glob-
alization. It also strengthens the concept of the Union as one of cultural 
communication. 
While preparing the European Constitution in 2002/2003, the Constitu-
tional Convention and many media in Europe discussed the meaning of re-
ligion for the political future of Europe. This was one of the most serious 
debates on the topic of identity in Europe for many years, free of cynicism 
and with the intention to understand the importance of religion in the life of 
many Europeans, no matter how strong the overall degree of secularization 
in Europe might be. In the end, the Constitution did not include a convinc-
ing and integrative appreciation of the diversity of religious creeds and ex-
pressions of faith in today’s Europe. This remains however an important 
topic, not just for the question of religious faith as such, but most impor-
tantly for the question: How do religious traditions and convictions impact 
our understanding of critical moral issues in today’s world? This is a matter 
of universal importance: Think of issues like stem-cell research or related 
questions of the moral impact of technical progress in medicine that effects 
our definition of the beginning and the end of human life.
25 
 
25  See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Ein christliches Europa, Salzburg: Pustet, 2004. Ludger Kühnhardt 
24   
Europe today is confronted with the fact that not only does Islam constitute 
the second largest religious community in the European Union. The ques-
tion of possible Turkish membership in the European Union will increase 
the importance of building cultural communication across religious bor-
ders, no matter how the accession issue will finally be resolved. For the 
time being, Muslims constitute around 3.5 per cent of the overall EU popu-
lation of 455 million. With Turkey as an EU member, the percentage of 
Muslims inside the EU would increase to 15 per cent. Would such a per-
centage for a religious minority really damage or destroy the leading pat-
tern of Christian identity that has shaped most of Europe’s traditions? De-
fensive Christianity is probably more its own problem than the religious 
creed of other Europeans. Libertarian secularism will not be an convincing 
answer either. It rather seems as if Europe has to learn to live with more 
religious diversity and at the same time has to develop an inclusive notion 
as far as the value of a public role of religion is concerned, accommodating 
all religions present in the EU.
26 May be less spectacular than the relation-
ship with Islam, but no less important is the fact that with enlargement of 
the European Union to South Eastern Europe the continent is beginning to 
rediscover the split between Latin and Orthodox Christianity with its impli-
cation for social and economic ethics, just to mention one example. As with 
Islam, this is not just a theological matter, but a question relating to the 
evolution of European political culture. Time and again Europe has to re-
discover and incorporate new elements of diversity that will transfigure the 
unity Europe is striving to achieve under the roof of the European Union. 
The challenge is to maintain an inclusive concept of cultural communica-
tion yet not to resort to a relativistic concept of human dignity and the in-
terpretation of human rights. 
So far, most successful activities to build cultural communities in Europe 
were rather issue-related and functional, no matter whether or not they 
were policy-induced or originated from civil society initiatives. It is worth 
mentioning the EURO NEWS TV channel, accessible in all EU member 
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states in the respective national language. This TV program gives you a 
rather EU oriented overview of the most important political, economic and 
cultural events – and of course sports, which has always been much ahead 
as a means to strengthen cultural communication in Europe. It is also worth 
mentioning the bilateral television channel “ARTE”, a commercial televi-
sion station broadcasting the same program simultaneously in German and 
French.
27 In spite of these promising examples, the media remain the weak-
est link in the chain to establish a European public sphere: All print media 
and practically all electronic in the EU remain oriented towards a specific 
national political system. They have begun to cover EU developments only 
recently with more professionalism. 
28 
The traditional sequence of activities favorable for the promotion of cul-
tural communication has obviously been practiced in Europe: promoting 
language studies and student exchanges, twinning cities and declaring an 
interesting city the “Cultural Capital of Europe”, each year on a rotating 
system, which is much linked to cultural tourism and has turned out to be a 
source of strengthening “European-ness” across the EU. 
One important aspect cannot be missing from a comparative assessment of 
the situations in Northeast Asia and in the EU: The effort to establish a 
European history textbook. Historians and other intellectuals from across 
the EU have developed interesting, even impressive examples of textbooks, 
which try to narrate the complex history of Europe as a permanent interplay 
of national histories.
29 Without understanding that commonality in the 
European civilization is the binding glue, they argue, one could never un-
derstand the diversity, and the antagonisms and conflicts in Europe. It is 
worth, for instance, to study different national expressions of architecture, 
but to learn about the only one European period of baroque architecture, to 
study different European expressions of art, but to learn about the only one 
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European period of impressionism, to study different European expressions 
of literature, but to learn about the only one European period of existential-
ism or of romanticism. 
Beyond writing textbooks as joint efforts to create a common European 
view of its own history, governments have also been involved in promoting 
the elimination of hatred and prejudice in textbooks that deal with the most 
contested aspects of European history. This, of course, has gone way be-
yond the European Union and originated in the efforts to tame and over-
come the Cold War divide between East and West Europe. It began with a 
German-Polish and a German-Russian history textbook commission. A 
German institute, the Georg-Eckert-Institute, set up to coordinate this proc-
ess as part of confidence building measures and the establishment of new 
human bonds among former enemies, has broadened its perspective and 
promoted its expertise among the different people of former Yugoslavia, 
where the divided memory of history is still all-pervasive and highly politi-
cized.  
Can any lessons be drawn from these and related European experiences for 
the noble search to built cultural communication in Northeast Asia? Some 
conclusions one might draw with all caution from the European experience 
in building cultural communities as part of long and unfinished processes to 
built a full-fledged European Union as the new expression of the European 
body politic: 
Northeast Asia would be well advised not to start overambitious and under-
funded. The very noble role of building cultural communication should 
probably begin with gradual processes and with a limited, realistic scope, 
manageable in terms of human resources and of financial resources. It can 
easily overburden partners if too much shall be achieved at the same time. 
It could also generate resilience if the starting point is too conceptual and 
principled as it can easily politicize and derail the process. 
Northeast Asia would be well advised to recognize cultural communication 
as a pluralistic process. As there is no center of culture, there cannot be 
centralized cultural communication. It ought to flow in manifold ways, put-
ting trust into the ambition, curiosity and creativity of the human mind. Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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This might require a political and bureaucratic frame of support, but cul-
tural communication can only flourish if it will be felt by the people, by 
civil society and its manifold expressions as useful, stimulating and valu-
able. 
Northeast Asia would be well advised to start somewhat non-political, for 
instance with an essay competition among high-school students in all coun-
tries of the region on the question “Direction Northeast Asia: The meaning 
of cultural communication in our part of the world”. 
Northeast Asia would be well advised to promote the inclusion of cultural 
matters in the wider context of a scheme for cooperation and security in 
Northeast Asia, which also addresses matters of security, economic coop-
eration, confidence-building measures, technological exchange and human 
contacts. 
Northeast Asia would be well advised to go its own way instead of waiting 
until anybody else in the world will start what the main actors in the region 
have to consider their own duty. There is no cultural center in any region of 
the world that will nurture trust, generate sustainable support among as 
many citizens as possible and anticipate political evolutions to the benefit 
of all cultures and the dialogue among the people in the world. Cultural 
communication does not distinguish between center and periphery. Where 
there is culture, there is a center. Periphery is alien to culture although, as 
we have experienced, creativity often comes in from the fringes. 
Three principle guidelines might unite the search for cultural communities 
both in Europe and in Northeast Asia.
30 First and foremost, it will be essen-
tial to develop what political philosopher John Stuart Mill has called 
“communities of recollection”. They will design the mental map which we 
apply to understand the current world and our duties in tomorrow’s world. 
If we reflect about mental maps, it might, for instance, be worth thinking 
which paintings or photos are most widely used in our school books to un-
derline what history means to us. By now, in Europe – all across Western, 
Eastern, Northern and Southern Europe! -  a certain telling consent exists 
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regarding the most widely spread defining images of European self-
interpretation. On top of the continent-wide list of paintings and photos 
used in school textbooks across of all Europe are: John Turnbulls “Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence” (1776), Jacques-Louis Davids “Oath at 
the Beginning of the French Revolution” (1789), Eugene Isabeys “Session 
of the Congress of Vienna”(1815), Eugene Delacroix’ “Massacre of Chios 
and Greece on the Ruins of Missolunghi”(1826), Anton Alexander von 
Werners “Proclamation of the German Empire in the Versailles Castle” 
(1871), William Orpens “Signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty” (1919), a 
photo of Lenin talking to Red Army soldiers (1920), Pablo Picassos “Bom-
bardment of Guernica” (1937), a photo of the Yalta Conference (1945), a 
photo of the Soviet flag over the German parliament in Berlin(1945) and a 
photo of the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). As a good number of paintings 
and photos from this list do not represent happy moments of European his-
tory, one has to conclude: It is not the content of these paintings and photos 
that matter, but how they are interpreted with hindsight knowledge in order 
to learn from past failures.
31 One might wonder which paintings and pic-
tures such a list would contain to reflect Northeast Asia’s self-portrayal. 
As far as more political principles are concerned, it would be fair to include 
in the list of a European community of recollections: the rejection of impe-
rialism and racism, the rejection of totalitarianism and nationalism, sensi-
tivity toward hegemonic inclinations of any partner or neighbor, primacy of 
rule of law and respect for human rights, appreciation of freedom and soli-
darity, confidence in supranational integration among ourselves and multi-
lateral processes with all other partners in the world. These principles are 
based in a Europe-wide “community of recollections” which is still weak in 
certain regions of South Eastern Europe and contested to this day in the 
Northern Caucasus. Yet, and this would be a second principle serving as 
lightning rod, it will remain without alternative to root the further devel-
opment of cultural communication in the success of common experience. 
This is why it has become important to write the history of European inte-
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gration. This is why it is also indicative how much the knowledge of for-
eign languages has spread: In 1950, about ten per cent of Europeans were 
able to speak a foreign language. Today, about half of all Europeans speak 
foreign languages; in the young generation even two third speak another 
language. Most widely spread, of course, is English, but the European Un-
ion is propagating that every European should learn two foreign languages 
beside his or her mother tongue.  
Finally, the third principle that is relevant for the constitution of a European 
public sphere and probably for any formation of cultural communication is 
the willingness to face the future as a common task. Neither battles or vic-
tories of the past, nor good or bad interpretations of history, neighbors and 
actions do help us in this regard. It is only the unwavering commitment to 
address the challenges that life brings to our doorsteps that will bring us 
forward and guarantee a good future for our children. In this task, Europe 
and Northeast Asia find common and comparable ground in search of the 
specific expression of each of our specific regional cultural communication 
and a public sphere.
32 
IV. 
Against this background, the perspective for immediate structures of re-
gional integration in Northeast Asia comparable with the European ambi-
tion to pool sovereignty, law and governance does not look too bright yet. 
In the first place, Northeast Asian countries and actors have to clarify topi-
cal and methodological confusion. Not every reference to regionalism 
means region-building. Northeast Asia is blessed with a wide array of pro-
posals for “free trade agreements” (FTA) and “preferential trade agree-
ments” (PTA).
33 It sometimes seems as if the perspective of free trade 
agreements has become a mania, not hampered by the obvious absence of 
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political trust among many of the people and countries in the region. As 
there is nothing wrong with viable free trade agreements, in themselves 
they do not constitute a structure of regional integration. They might be 
considered a pre-integration scheme and certainly they comply with the 
logic and aspiration of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Region-
building might begin with a free trade agreement and a free trade agree-
ment does not preclude the development towards more comprehensive 
schemes of political and legal forms of integration. But there should be no 
doubt that free trade agreements per se are expressions of regional coopera-
tion, not of regional integration.  
As all Northeast Asian countries are inspired and driven by modernization 
nationalism – or at least by efforts to consolidate the achievements of their 
modernization nationalism – they are putting the main emphasis of their 
international positioning on the development of geo-economic considera-
tions. It seems as if politics is of secondary importance in designing the fu-
ture of Northeast Asia, although political disputes, at times of an archaic 
nature, are reverberating through the region. The lack of political leader-
ship across Northeast Asian countries – and most notably in the democratic 
countries of the region – stands in stark contrast to the pro-active, at times 
even aggressive leadership style of the most important companies of the 
region. No projection of global ambition seems too far-fetched for the 
companies with big brand names originating in Northeast Asia. Since long, 
the successful Korean companies in the fields of automobile and telecom-
munication have gained parity with Japanese branch names in the field. It is 
only a matter of time that Chinese companies will become household 
names across the world.  
Conceptualizing Northeast Asia on the basis of its economic potential is a 
matter of macro-economic fine-tuning. Conceptualizing Northeast Asia in a 
comprehensive way including geopolitical and regime considerations re-
quires a broader focus. Its first premise must be the recognition of existing 
realities and trends. A Northeast Asian order will not evolve from scratch 
based on anybody’s blueprint. As much as Northeast Asia is embedded in 
its historic legacies and ligatures, it is embedded in its wider ties and pre-
defining constellations. It is unlikely at this point in history that Northeast Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
  31
Asia will generate a regional order based on its own initiative alone. It is 
rather more predictable to assume that Northeast Asia might get increas-
ingly involved in existing or newly emerging schemes with an external 
rooting. They could certainly be transformed over time by Northeast Asian 
interests and initiatives. And they could even experience the shifting of 
their center towards Northeast Asia and its leading countries. But without 
an external input, region-building in Northeast Asia is barely conceivable 
in the first decade of the 21
st century. Three components can be found in 
the region and they might evolve over time into a new and comprehensive 
order for Northeast Asia, if not for the whole of East Asia.  
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has become a lose scheme 
framing the vast region in the broadest possible way. The primacy of eco-
nomic modernization and development has brought together all littoral 
states of the Pacific Ocean. Annual Summit meetings of the heads of state 
gain public attention, but all other activities of APEC are rather peripheral 
and lack the potential for a quantum leap in regional integration. The coop-
erative structure of APEC allows for the broadest possible inclusion of 
membership with a set of contradictions almost reminding of the United 
Nations. APEC, the official webpage operating from the APEC Secretariat 
in Singapore states, “is the only inter governmental grouping in the world 
operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue and 
equal respect for the views of all participants”.
34 APEC has no treaty obli-
gation and decisions are made by consensus among its 21 member states. 
APEC was founded in 1989 in order “to enhance economic growth and 
prosperity for the region and to strengthen the Asia-Pacific community”.
35 
The reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers across the Asia-Pacific re-
gion has been the main objective of APEC activities “creating efficient 
domestic economies and dramatically increasing exports”.
36 It is hard to 
recognize APEC as an institution, yet scholars from the region claim it to 
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be “a central organ for Asian regionalism”.
37 For the time being, APEC 
vacillates between a consultative and a negotiation body. 
Yet, in the long run APEC might evolve into a lose, almost informal net of 
ties across Asia-Pacific that uses its economic primacy as starting point in 
order to emulate some sort of Asian-Pacific identity. In doing so, it could 
become somewhat comparable to the role of the Council of Europe. APEC 
will most likely continue to lack political power while it continues to breed 
in the absence of the center-stage of either any of its members or any fo-
cused strategic objective beyond the growth of the economies in the region. 
ASEAN +3 has been described as “the most important change in Asia-
Pacific regionalism” since the economic and financial crisis of 1997, laud-
ing its nature as “an Asia-only regional economic cooperation”.
38 
ASEAN+3 has become the formula for growing approximation of China, 
Japan and South Korea towards the original ASEAN community, estab-
lished in 1967. ASEAN is the closest structure comparable to a viable re-
gional integration scheme in Asia, representing the collective will of its 
member nations “to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation 
and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for 
posterity the blessings of peace, freedom, and prosperity”. 
39 Yet, in spite of 
a successful economic history of four decades, in spite of its original suc-
cess in taming and stopping communist expansion in Southeast Asia, and in 
spite of its enlargement to former communist countries Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia as well as to the controversial Myanmar governed by authoritar-
ian military rule, ASEAN has not been able to consistently implement 
structures or mechanisms of a supra-national character comparable to 
European integration. While this might turn out to be advantageous in order 
to fully incorporate China, Japan and South Korea at some point as 
ASEAN members, the absence of supra-national elements will most cer-
tainly redefine the original character of ASEAN and shift its center of 
 
37  Hyun-Seok Yu, “Asian Regionalism: A Post-Crisis Perspective.” Regional Integra-
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O’Callaghan, op.cit.: 30.  
38  Ibid.:38. 
39  Association of Southeast Asian Nations, <www.aseansec.org/64.htm> Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
  33
power towards Northeast Asia should its three leading economies join 
ASEAN one day. Its current absence means the absence of law-abiding 
mechanisms that generate predictable legal behavior. 
With annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3, optimists consider this the 
beginning of an East Asian Community, and at least the frame for an even-
tual East Asian Free Trade Area. China has discovered ASEAN+3 as a 
valuable forum to project its interest of economic cooperation and match it 
with broader strategic considerations, shared by Japan and Korea. Taiwan 
finds itself marginalized as it is neither a member of ASEAN nor consid-
ered partner of the ASEAN+3 mechanism. This feeling of exclusion is 
shared by the US, which has warned the original ASEAN member states 
not to go too far in their cooperation with China. ASEAN’s fear to be 
dominated by China is balanced by the fascination for the new rise of 
China.  Since 1999, ASEAN and the representatives of China, Japan and 
South Korea have intensified their contacts and cooperation. ASEAN main-
tains a wide set of bodies and a broad array of activities, yet it is lacking the 
definite political commitment and decision-making mechanism that would 
constitute a regional integration system similar to the European experience. 
Should ASEAN over time embrace China, Japan and South Korea as full 
members, Southeast and Northeast Asia would move under one umbrella 
representing East Asia as a whole. This could turn from an economic block 
to a strategic asset, certainly in accordance with long-term Chinese interests 
in the region and vis-à-vis the United States. But it could likewise raise 
skepticism in Japan and worry in some of the smaller ASEAN countries 
because of likely Chinese dominance. It is, however, not inconceivable that 
such a development might evolve within a decade or so, underlining the 
primacy of the economy in current East Asian order-building. 
An interesting component evolving from the original ASEAN has been the 
development of its ASEAN Regional Forum, established in 1994 and 
broadening the economic cooperation into the sphere of security and strat-
egy. It must also be mentioned that ASEAN or ASEAN+3 has been identi-
fied as the conceivable format for the evolution of an East Asian currency Ludger Kühnhardt 
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system.
40 So far, however, the emergence of conceptual thoughts has not 
been matched with a genuine political will among the main governments 
involved. While the potential of an East Asian currency system – and even-
tually of an East Asian monetary union – must be recognized, its imple-
mentation would clearly be a function of Chinese-Japanese strategic con-
siderations. They, in turn, are a function of the overall Northeast Asian stra-
tegic landscape and development. By its nature, emphasis on the strategic 
perspectives for Northeast Asia strengthens the role and influence of the 
US. While APEC, although not of a strategic nature, has been US-
sponsored and ASEAN and ASEAN+3 are “Asian-only” without US par-
ticipation, the strategic future of Northeast Asia is inconceivable without a 
strong role played by the US. World War II, after all, has not been com-
pletely ended in Northeast Asia. 
Confronted with the imminent danger of a North Korean nuclear bomb, the 
US, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea came together in 
the first semi-formal multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia 
during several rounds of talks in 2003 and 2004. The US-sponsored “Six 
Party Talks” were originally directed to deal with the North Korean nuclear 
issue, one of the consequences of an overlap of World War II legacies, 
Cold War parameters and struggle for anti-Western national autonomy and 
primacy of national sovereignty in Northeast Asia. The withdrawal of 
North Korea from the “Six Party Talk” in 2004 did not make them obso-
lete. To the contrary, it is particularly in the interest of South Korea to 
maintain the format of the “Six Party Talks” and stretch its content beyond 
the nuclear issue to cover all other matters of security and cooperation in 
Northeast Asia. 
The format of the “Six Party Talks” might serve as inspiration for the grad-
ual evolution of a Northeast Asian security system. At best, it could evolve 
into a mechanism comparable with the “Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe” (CSCE), one of the key engines in helping to overcome 
the Cold War and the continental division in Europe. As the Cold War is 
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still alive in Northeast Asia as far as the partition of the Korean peninsula 
and the prevalence of the outlandish political and socio-economic system in 
North Korea is concerned, improvement in regional security cooperation 
can only be welcomed. As key member of the “Six Party Talks”-format, 
the continuous role of the United States as an Asian power would be guar-
anteed. Obvious is the absence of the European Union in the strategic dis-
course about the Northeast Asian security architecture. Given the enormous 
economic interest of Europe in the stable development of Northeast Asia, 
this is astonishing and reflects the limited global projection of the EU’s 
ambition for a comprehensive Foreign and Security, but also the limited 
interest of the United States and, most likely, also of China to include an-
other external actor into the security conundrum of Northeast Asia. While 
the EU is a preferential partner of ASEAN and has successfully established 
an EU-Asian consultancy mechanism on economic and financial issues, the 
absence of the EU in the strategic discourse about the future of Northeast 
Asia is deplorable as far as Europe’s global interests are concerned.
41  
Europe is also absent as far as the formulation of any comprehensive con-
cept for the future of political regimes and good governance in Northeast 
Asia is concerned. It is ambivalent in its relationship with China regarding 
the dissolution of the ban of arms export imposed upon its gigantic trade 
partner after the Tiananmen Square massacres of June 1989. The impact of 
its human rights policy and the promotion of rule of law in China have re-
mained limited, not the least due to the growing self-assertiveness of the 
Chinese leadership. The EU is development aid-oriented (and almost non-
political) in its policy of constructive engagement towards North Korea. It 
is apolitical in its economic relations with Taiwan and South Korea. And it 
is extremely low key as far as sharing historical experience with its partner 
Japan without getting involved in the usual moral rhetoric on matters re-
lated to Japan’s way of coming to terms (or rather: not properly coming to 
terms) with its legacy of World War II that is still highly irritating and frus-
trating many former victim nations in Asia, far beyond Northeast Asia. In 
light of the fact that Japan, after all, is a modern democratic state based in 
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rule of law, its systemic antagonism to China – but probably even more so 
the different political culture of the two countries - is the ultimate reason 
for the recurrent misuse (by both sides) of historical issues and symbols as 
yardsticks of measuring the balance of power relationship between con-
temporary Japan and contemporary China. No matter the instrumental issue 
of history (used by China and Japan alike), the difference between rule of 
law democracy in Japan and one-party communist rule in China makes it 
unlikely, certainly for the time being, for both countries to play the same 
role France and Germany did play for European integration.
42 China would 
have to grow into a completely different political and legal system to be 
able to become a systemically identical partner for Japan in playing such a 
role. Japan would have to change its attitude vis-à-vis symbolic nationalism 
(Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine including), which is a 
permanent provocation of its neighbors.  
The key experience of European integration - trust-based legal and political 
integration - cannot be achieved by means of security cooperation or eco-
nomic interdependency. Both are tools to ease tensions or to contribute to 
the overall transformation of a zero-sum mentality into a win-win paradigm 
for all. But legally binding commitment to commonality and political 
mechanisms requires recognition of legitimate decisions beyond the modus 
of unanimity; integration must declare the principle of non-interference into 
the domestic affairs of any partner country obsolete. Therefore, systemic 
cohesion of governance and political culture alike are preconditions to sub-
stantial integration. They require mutual recognition of rule of law, democ-
ratic governance and a primacy for human rights. Unless there is no con-
sensus on this – in real political life and not only on paper – Northeast Asia 
will remain tight to its historical legacy of obstacles to regional integration. 
Region-building might continue as a selective process of joint interest for-
mation. But it will remain subject to unpredictable motions that are ulti-
mately rooted in the difference and contradiction among obviously dispa-
rate political cultures and regimes in Northeast Asia.  
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It seems to be an iron law that economic competition in Northeast Asia re-
inforces the region’s fascination with big power politics, primacy of na-
tional sovereignty and skepticism for regional integration. However, it can-
not be ruled out categorically that over time Northeast Asia’s primacy for 
the economy will alter the role of politics. In doing so, Northeast Asia 
would have to redefine the relationship between politics and the economy, 
thus becoming the first post-modern region in which de-politicized trading 
states would transform their mutual political relations from big power pri-
macy to cooperative and integrative regionalism only by way of economic 
means. With the recognition of the principle of “one country, two systems” 
in Hong Kong (since 1997) and in Macau (since 1999), the Chinese leader-
ship in Beijing has demonstrated its potential for certain flexibility and 
creativity in the pursuit of national goals. But for the time being, it is hardly 
imaginable (but should not be fully excluded) that such an approach could 
succeed unchallenged as far as the future of Taiwan is concerned. In any 
case, the evolution of relations between the People’s Republic of China and 
Taiwan remains the central test-case to prove skepticism about the dissolu-
tion of big power politics in Northeast Asia wrong. While both mainland 
China and Taiwan (and Taiwan’s political parties) struggle over how to ap-
ply the principle of “one-China”, they are even more bitterly divided over 
the legacy of ideological rifts whose power has begun to vanish. The first-
ever visit of Taiwanese Kuomintang leader Lien Chan to mainland China in 
early 2005 was indicative of the potential path of reconciliation. Before 
meeting the Secretary General of China’s Communist Party and Head of 
State, Hu Jintao, in Beijing, Lien Chan paid respect to Sun Yat Sen at his 
tomb in Nanking, revered by nationalists and communists alike as the 
founder of the anti-feudal, anti-imperial Chinese Republic. After their talks, 
Hu invoked the imminent great reawakening of the Chinese nation. 
Whether republicanism and a shared sense of material prosperity as road to 
reinvigorate China’s global strength might ultimately suffice to overcome 
the ideological barriers and territorial splits of the Cold War remains to be 
seen. The transformation of the People’s Republic of China from a rigid 
Maoist-Marxist country to a trading state under a patriotic, if not increas-
ingly nationalistic one-party rule indicates the enormous Chinese potential Ludger Kühnhardt 
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of pragmatism. Western notions of politics are probably too much burdened 
with legacies and scars of ideology to believe in the primacy of economic 
materialism. But in China, Confucian ethics and neo-patriotism might 
prove the universal applicability of Western notions of politics wrong.  
The approximation and eventual reconciliation of mainland China and 
Taiwan might indeed follow a genuine East Asian logic of relations be-
tween business and politics, power and culture. As long as good-weather 
periods prevail, the competitive character of Northeast Asian economies 
might not trouble any of the regional actors in these efforts. But irritations 
or outright symptoms of crisis in either of the countries could. The sensitiv-
ity of the People’s Republic of China to a possible Taiwanese Declaration 
of Independence – which Beijing considered a justification for military in-
tervention across the Taiwan Straits as recent as in April 2005– is indica-
tive. The unpredictable future of the divided Korean peninsula and the un-
predictable social evolution in China as the downside of its economic rise 
are further matters of concern for Northeast Asia that could not be easily 
accommodated with the image of an evolving cultural community of coop-
eration. Estimates regarding the prospects of China’s enormous moderniza-
tion vary: While some Chinese analysts suggest that China might catch up 
with America’s “comprehensive national power” (CNP) in 2020, others see 
China “reaching only 61 percent of America’s and achieving a rank seventh 
in the world, even below that of South Korea, at 65 percent of America’s 
CNP”.
43 More pessimistic Chinese projections mention only 50, if not 40 
percent of US comprehensive national power.
44 With an average growth 
rate of 10 percent per year during most of 1990 until 2005, China stands 
above all other economies in the world. Trade as percentage of its GDP has 
doubled once every decade since the late 1970s, from 5.2 percent in 1970 
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to 44 percent in 2001 (compared with 18 percent for Japan, 19 percent for 
the US and 20 percent for India). China has thus become the sixth largest 
trading country in the world, after the US, Germany, Japan, France, and the 
United Kingdom. Compared to a per capita income of $40.000 in Japan and 
$10.000 in South Korea, China is still poor with an average per capita in-
come of around $ 1.000. But the trend towards successful market-based 
modernization is as impressive as the size of the Chinese population guar-
antees a continuous expansion of the country’s economy. As long as 
China’s economy is booming, social tension, internal migration and the ur-
ban-rural divide are of secondary concern and might be accommodated. 
But what would happen in case of slowdown and crisis in China? The Chi-
nese government has already struggled to tame the sometimes overheated 
economic boom while recognizing the dangerous urban-rural divide with 
100 to 150 million surplus rural workers roaming between low-paid city 
jobs and rural unemployment. 
While China is threatening its own success through the excesses of an 
overly booming modernization, North Korea’s threat stems from failed 
modernization. As long as North Korea is a stable and sovereign state, it 
poses a potential threat to South Korea and a permanent tragedy to its own 
people. Yet, both these factors do not unravel the socio-economic and secu-
rity web of Northeast Asia. But what would happen in case of an implosion 
of the system and a break-down of order in inter-Korean relations?
45 South 
Korean contingency plans for mass refugee movements and plans to absorb 
millions of North Koreans or to enabling them to lead a sustainable life in 
their own home are currently merely theoretical calculations. Fact of the 
matter is the secluded character of the regime in Pyongyang and the limited 
external influence that can be exerted on its actions. While Russia is pursu-
ing a policy of restrained neutrality vis-à-vis North Korea, China and the 
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US see North Korea also as a function of their overall geopolitical relation-
ship and its inherent struggle over primacy in Asian affairs. This makes 
South Korea the weakest chain in this equation. As long as the situation is 
stable and does not change fundamentally, “only” the North Koreans are 
suffering. Should the situation alter exponentially – no matter in which di-
rection – South Koreas impressive rise and stability and the overall North-
east Asian geopolitical and geo-economic landscape might suffer, too. In 
light of this prospect, it seems as if Northeast Asia is hold hostage to North 
Koreas unpredictability, which is the consequence of a combination of na-
tionalist rivalries, ideological contradictions, Cold War paradigms and 
post-Cold War constructivist search for order. Northeast Asia’s strategic 
limbo is also a consequence of the unresolved structure of the long-term 
relationship between the US and China.  
V. 
The European Union is pursuing a policy of economic and technological 
cooperation with Northeast Asia as it does vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. But the 
EU has not been able to enlarge its interest and project its ability to con-
tribute to the strategic development in Northeast Asia. It has also been am-
bivalent as far as the degree of its normative policy approach is concerned. 
While human rights matter a lot in EU rhetoric (“community of values”), in 
reality the primacy of the economy seems to dominate while the EU is too 
weak. The EU is also too weak, particularly vis-à-vis China, to pursue a 
policy of stringent human rights enforcement while simultaneously increas-
ing economic cooperation. This conflict of aim seems always to be won by 
economic arguments. However, from its own experience the EU knows the 
limited potential of economic interconnectedness if political trust and 
commonly binding legal norms remain absent or limited; in this regard, 
Northeast Asia cannot be different from Europe. Northeast Asia, so it 
seems, is not only paradoxical to itself, but also to the European Union.  
All the more challenging for Europe should be Francis Fukuyama’s sugges-
tion to establish a multilateral system in Northeast Asia. “With the end of 
the Cold War and the continuing economic development of eastern Asia,” Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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he wrote, “power relationships are changing in ways that have unlocked 
nationalist passions and rivalries. The potential for misunderstanding and 
conflict among South Korea, Japan, and China will be significant in the 
coming years – but it can be mitigated if multiple avenues of discussion 
exist between the states.”
46 The plea for multilateralism in Northeast Asia 
by one of the leading conservative American academics should be a chal-
lenge and an encouragement for the European Union to contemplate and 
focus its own strategic interests in the region.  But where is the EU while 
Americans begin to discuss Northeast Asian multilateralism, the dearest 
idea for many Europeans?  
Fukuyama suggested to turn the multilateral security framework that has 
emerged in Northeast Asia under the label of “Six-Party Talks”  into a 
“Five-Power Forum” – that is to say with US, Chinese, Japanese, South 
Korean and Russian participation without keeping North Korea on board. 
He anticipates such a “Five-Power Forum” to clearly become an “institu-
tional innovation”.
47 Participation of the European Union in a potential 
Northeast Asian security forum was not mentioned by Fukuyama. While in 
the Middle East the EU is active and recognized partner of the “Quartet” 
(EU, US, UN, Russia) promoting a Road Map for the resolution of the con-
flict between Israel and the Palestinians, strategic considerations for the 
future of Northeast Asia evolve in the seemingly natural absence of a pos-
sible role for the European Union. Nobody else than the EU itself is to be 
criticized for this EU underperformance. It is on the EU to project its ideas 
and concepts for global order, also as far as Northeast Asia’s future is con-
cerned. “A secure Europe in a better world”, as the EU’s Security Strategy 
is titled without discussing Northeast Asia in any relevant manner, will re-
quire such a broadening of the EU’s foreign policy horizon.
48 The sooner it 
will happen, the better for the interests of Europe. 
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In recognition of the difficulties and obstacles to regional integration in 
Northeast Asia, the EU could offer experience-based ideas that might be 
fruitful for the long-term evolution of region-building in Northeast Asia. 
While Fukuyama is suggesting “security first”, and most Asian analysts 
favor “economy first”, the EU must conceptualize its Northeast Asian strat-
egy as one of “law first”. The promotion of norm-based interaction would 
contribute to turn suspicion and distrust in Northeast Asia into mutually 
advantageous and predictable patterns under common legal frames. It is not  
difficult to identify critical areas of modern life in which the enhancement 
of legal norms and predictable patterns of norm-based behavior could be a 
win-win-situation for all Northeast Asian countries and societies: The fu-
ture development of telecommunication technologies and related regulatory 
matters, the evolution of medical research, environmental protection and 
sea safety, finally also the issue of commercial law and the terms of con-
duct for production, services and labor in Northeast Asia. This list might be 
prolonged, but it constitutes a beginning beyond the traditional neglect of 
the perspective of a common regional legal acquis and the traditional domi-
nance of zero-sum-mentalities in North East Asia. 
For the time being, Northeast Asian analysts are primarily interested in 
studying the experience of the European Union that led to the creation of a 
common European currency. Across Northeast Asia (and beyond), Euro-
pean Monetary Union is “considered a putative benchmark for understand-
ing how a system of monetary cooperation might be devised in Asia”.
49  
Beyond the economic and financial issue, Philomena Murray has discussed 
the historical, political, institutional and legal aspects of a possible emula-
tion of the European experience in Northeast Asia (which she irritatingly 
summarizes as “Asia”). Some of her thoughts deserve to be reiterated: The 
common role of EU member states as donors of aid could be a particular 
inspiration for ASEAN+3, not the least as far as their relations with the im-
poverished Pacific Island nations is concerned. In this regard, one might 
imagine a broad array of possible cooperation between ASEAN and the 
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EU, which has defined its relations with the poor countries of the Pacific, 
Africa and the Caribbean since 2000 under the frame of the “Cotonou 
Agreement”.
50 Philomena Murray also reflected the possibility of institu-
tional emulations based on the evolution of the European integration proc-
ess.  
It might indeed be worthwhile for the EU to engage its partners in 
ASEAN+3 in a dialogue about an appropriate East Asian mechanism simi-
lar to the European Council, to suggest to them a structure similar to the 
European Parliament (beginning with a delegated Assembly as was the 
EEC case), and, last but not least, to support the creation of an institution 
equivalent to the European Court of Justice. One should not forget some 
other aspects that were relevant in the European context and might carry 
food for thought in Northeast Asia: The dialectical importance of the inter-
play between “deepening” and “widening”, which  in Europe were never 
mutually exclusive, but in the end always mutually reinforcing processes; 
the function of trial and error and notably the function of crises as an ena-
bling engine of new integration dynamics; the potential of overlapping in-
stitutions, at least for some time  – as was also the case in Europe with the 
parallel existence of EEC, Council of Europe and EFTA – to facilitate the 
gradual evolution of a comprehensive integration scheme; the meaning, and 
at times, usefulness of integration detours in order to reach the intended 
goal by way of recalibrating priorities, instruments, policies and even 
goals; finally, the usefulness of a “flexibility clause” facilitating the inte-
gration progress among partner countries more ready and capable of speed-
ing up integration without excluding the commitment of late-comers.  
ASEAN, in the words of Philomena Murray, remains “the most promising 
regional body in Asia”.
51 Whether or not this nucleus of regional integra-
tion in South East Asia has the potential to grow into the nucleus of re-
gional integration for the whole of East Asia can only be judged by history.  
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But for the time being, ASEAN, and moreover ASEAN+3   indicate a po-
tential of genuine autonomous developments in East Asia that has not been 
transferred into the arena of political will and a concise interest formula-
tion. However, over time it should be in the interest of political leaders in 
South East and in North East Asia to concentrate their efforts on the crea-
tion of a genuine regional concept of order that frames, solidifies and pro-
tects their impressive socio-economic modernization. In the absence of a 
political order for the whole region, this socio-economic dynamism re-
mains dependent upon contingent and external causes as far as its long-
term viability is concerned. East Asia will need regional order-building to 
project and sustain its economic stability beyond the rationality of econom-
ics. 
In the end, political constructivism will be necessary to establish a North 
East Asian (or even a comprehensive East Asian) regional order beyond 
economic rationality. Which type of leadership the political systems of 
North East Asia will generate during the next decade or so is a matter of 
speculation. It should however not come as a surprise if elements of cul-
tural rationality will match economic rationality in defining the long-term 
interests of North East Asia. Should North East Asia project its global in-
terests beyond the sphere of cooperative economic competition, it will have 
to design a political project that is autonomous and authentic. In the past, 
Northeast Asian political leadership has not been very impressive as far as 
the discourse on regional integration is concerned. Whether or not this 
might change in the years ahead is an open question. The incentives for 
politicians to position themselves as advocates for Northeast Asian regional 
integration are limited across Northeast Asia as long as a competitive na-
tional economic agenda dominates the political discourse in the region. 
Courage and long-term visions normally cannot rally voters in the region. 
Pragmatic economic concern matters most for the advancement of a politi-
cal career. In so far, politics in Northeast Asia remains primarily a function 
of economic rationality while, at least so far, it is forfeiting its potential to 
promote the political and cultural logic of regional integration. This logic, 
however, is also limited by objective regime differences across the region.  Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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Against this background, it should be in the interest of the European Union 
to project itself as an “Asian power” by contributing to a reassessment of 
the usefulness of regional integration in Northeast Asia through cooperative 
advice and by offering participation in any emerging multilateral security 
scheme in Northeast Asia. For the time being, the EU is still limiting its 
Asian policies to bilateral relations largely of an economic nature. This is 
neither specific not substantial enough to ultimately deal with the leading 
countries of this vast continent, the North East Asian powers China, Japan 
and South Korea including. The value of a regular “Asia-Europe Meeting” 
(ASEM) remains limited as long as it does not turn from consultative di-
plomacy to cooperative regionalism. This will require a transformation of 
the EU’s strategy in dealing with its ASEAN+3 partners. The EU would 
need a long-term strategy based on the primacy of multilateralism and inte-
gration and with a focus on the possible contributions of the EU to the 
emulation of relevant institutional and conceptual processes in Northeast 
Asia. 
1996 marked the beginning of the process of the “Asia-Europe Meeting” 
(ASEM). Taking place every two years, summit meetings of Heads of State 
and Government of all EU member states and the countries of ASEAN+3 
are characterized by informality, multidimensionality and emphasis on 
equal partnership.
52 In the meantime, 39 partners are coming together, for 
the last time in October 2004 in Hanoi. Annual ministerial meetings con-
tribute to intensified interaction and consultation on a variety of interna-
tional and bi-regional issues. The European Union however has not been 
able to introduce the conceptual development of regional order-building in 
East Asia into the ASEM agenda yet. Before doing so, the EU will be ad-
vised to formulate a comprehensive strategy that includes the preferable 
elements of a consultative exchange of thoughts on this matter and the in-
struments at hand for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy to impact a 
possible follow-up to any general strategic discussion. The EU simply 
needs a policy strategy for Northeast Asia, or probably more meaningful, a 
 
52  European Union, “The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)” www.europa.eu.int/comm 
/external_relations/asem/intro. So far ASEM summits were held in Bangkok 
(1996), London (1998), Seoul (2000), Copenhagen (2002) and Vietnam (2004).   Ludger Kühnhardt 
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comprehensive policy strategy for East Asia, that goes beyond a shallow 
diplomatic communiqué. It should emphasize EU interests, goals and 
means with particular reference to the advantages of regional order-
building in Northeast Asia with EU contribution and participation. 
During the Sixth ASEM summit, due in Europe in 2006, the EU could sug-
gest to launch a comprehensive and joint study of the potential for regional-
order building and law-based economic and political integration in 
ASEAN+3 as part of the evolution of a process that could lead to a bi-
regional association agreement with the EU (analogous to the EU-
MERCOSUR negotiation of a similar agreement that is currently under-
way). Also in the context of EU-ASEAN+3 relations the EU would find 
scope for the promotion of reflections about the advantages of law-based 
regional integration over the stubborn pursuit of sovereignty-based big 
power politics. Even if, for the time being, this would largely remain an 
academic endeavor, only the EU is available to support this topic as part of 
the overall agenda of European-Asian relations.  
The EU should become proactive in order to make sure that the “Six Party 
Talks” on the North Korean nuclear issue – restarted in July 2005 after one 
year of suspension – will include contributions of the European Union. A 
visit of the EU’s High Representative and the Commissioner for Foreign 
Affairs to Pyongyang in May 2001, a series of political dialogues on the 
level of high civil servants, and 393 million Euro humanitarian aid between 
1995 and 2005, which includes 115 million Euro in support of the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),
53 must be under-
stood as the basis for a more political involvement in the next phase of 
multilateral activities regarding the Korean Peninsula. The EU will not be 
able to legitimize its financial input into the alleviation of the Korean crisis 
if its representatives will not be included into any meaningful institutional-
ized form of multilateral mechanism regarding the security of Northeast 
Asia. EU taxpayers will not allow this to happen a second time. The EU 
should have learned this lesson from the experience with its financial sup-
 
53  European Union. “The EU’s relations with the Democratic Republic of Korea” 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index: 3-4. Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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port of the Palestinian Authority in the Middle East: For a long time, it 
seemed as if the EU was only welcome in the Middle East as a financial 
donor, while political matters were considered in the absence of the EU. 
Criticism in the EU about this semi-servile participation in Middle East 
politics grew and, in the end, only the EU’s inclusion in the Middle East 
“Quartet” justified the enormous financial contribution of the EU to the 
Middle East peace process. This analogy should be kept in mind in the con-
text of any emerging security structure for and in Northeast Asia. The EU 
must project its political will to be recognized as one of the facilitating and 
mediating powers in Northeast Asia. Otherwise, its claim to be a global 
partner would lose credibility, its financial contributions would face in-
creased criticism of EU taxpayers, and the overall EU interests in Northeast 
Asia would be undermined.  
As for leadership in Northeast Asian integration-building, the European 
Union should identify the normative preconditions necessary to proceed 
with realistic developments. It should therefore identify South Korea and 
Japan as potentially the first architects for the promotion of a Northeast 
Asian political integration mechanism. South Korea and Japan are the only 
solidly democratic countries in the region. They are the leading economies 
as far as the level of modernization and human development is concerned. 
They are OECD members and have demonstrated cooperation even in such 
fields as jointly organizing the World Soccer Tournament in 2002. Yet, the 
political relationship between both countries is still overshadowed by Ko-
rean suffering under Japanese colonial rule and the subsequent war that 
lead to the division of the Korean people and their homeland. Instead of 
continuously speculating about a possible Korean reunification, it would 
probably be more appropriate to contemplate the potential of South Korean 
and Japanese efforts to launch the first steps of a Northeast Asian integra-
tion scheme that recalls the experience and ambition of the European 
Community of Coal and Steel.  
The 2005 controversy between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo, a tiny 
island between Korea and Japan, could have been used in its catalytic func-
tion: The struggle over Dokdo was not about its territory or about historical 
arguments of right or wrong. It was primarily about the natural resources Ludger Kühnhardt 
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surrounding the island, and moreover it was about pride and power in 
Northeast Asia. Why could Dokdo therefore not serve the purpose of being 
identified as an appropriate object to trigger a process of law-based integra-
tion among Northeast Asia’s leading democracies? Here would be an issue 
that could serve to establish a common supranational authority with a lim-
ited purpose over a specified matter. As this was, by and large, the defini-
tion and intention of the architects of the European Community of Coal and 
Steel, one might wonder if and where a “Korean Jean Monnet” could ap-
pear. He or she would have to propose a joint authority over Dokdo and the 
related resources between South Korea and Japan. South Korea, Japan’s 
past victim, would have to go a long way indeed to accept such a visionary 
proposal. But no other country in Northeast Asia could generate the moral 
authority in impressing its neighbor and the world with such a proposal. 
And no country in the region other than Japan should proof its democratic 
maturity by embracing such an initiative by South Korea. This idea might 
sound like a strange dream, and it is so at the moment. But when studied in 
a broader perspective and with long-term considerations, there hardly 
seems a better opportunity for the two leading democratic trading states in 
Northeast Asia to begin an exceptional historical journey by bridging the 
waters that divide their shores through common authority over an island 
that is too small to be recognized by the world for its damaging potential.  
As for China, the EU must become more normative if its wants to be rec-
ognized as a global leader. Currently, the EU is contributing 100 million 
Euro for measures to support China’s integration into the international 
community and the global economy. With three million Euro annual in-
vestments in China and trade amounting to an annual sum of 150 billon 
Euro, the EU has every interest to promote China’s inclusion into the inter-
national economy, which has gone already an impressively long way since 
the beginning of reforms in China in 1978. The perspective of lifting the 
weapons embargo against China would caricature the EU’s efforts. Instead, 
the EU should rather address the discrepancies emanating from China’s 
WTO membership: The difficult provision of licenses to banks, insurance 
companies and telecommunication companies and matters of product pi-
racy are issues of continuous complain in Europe. The EU’s readiness to Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration 
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recognize China as market economy will not be strengthened if such Chi-
nese actions will prevail. As for human rights, the EU would be advised to 
insist on China signing the International Covenant on Political and Civil 
Rights. The EU must insist on this recognition of international norms by 
China in order to prevent that the rise of China will end up in a new variant 
of nationalism, which is relativistic about universal norms. Such a devel-
opment would be a paradoxical yet unhappy revision of China’s traditional 
universalism. Recognizing the UN Covenant on Political and Civil Rights 
by China would, inter alia, facilitate the return of alleged Chinese refugees 
from Europe. Most importantly, it would facilitate the dialogue about hu-
man rights and rule of law in China, particularly as far as the freedom of 
religion is concerned. For the time being, it is more than regrettable that 
freedom of religion remains a highly limited right in today’s China. 
In this context, the EU would also serve the purpose of a universal human 
rights dialogue if it would suggest to its Northeast Asian partners a norma-
tive debate about the implications of progress in medical research. The de-
velopment of stem-cell research is not an unrelated matter. At the core of 
the debate must be the dialogue about those values and religious norms 
constituting human anthropology. A dispute between proponents of Bud-
dhist concepts of reincarnation – justifying, for instance, therapeutic clon-
ing as a way to facilitate the rebirth of a weak embryo in the body of a 
strong and presumably healthier person – and Christian notions of the in-
alienability and uniqueness of the human person from the moment of con-
ception to the last breath of life, would certainly be of high quality and 
meaning for the inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue in the world. To-
gether with its Northeast Asian partners, the EU could encourage such a 
dialogue among representative of religions and civil society. 
In dealing with its Northeast Asian partners, the EU will encounter resis-
tance to multilateral and post-sovereigntist integration approaches by coun-
tries which combine self-confidence with traditional concepts about the 
primacy of big power politics and a limited recognition of the political 
character and global strategic role of the European Union. This should not 
prevent the EU from conceptualizing its authentic policy strategy for 
Northeast Asia. The application of European concepts of order-building Ludger Kühnhardt 
50   
and pooled sovereignty as alternative to big power politics, balance of 
power strategies and political mistrust coupled with competitive economies 
will never be easy in Northeast Asia. Whether or not this is only a matter of 
limited leadership qualities among Northeast Asian politicians will be 
tested by history. Yet, the EU should promote conceptual ideas of order-
building that transcend the contemporary myopic agenda of the region. 
That is what the EU owes to its self-asserted claim to be a global partner. 
And it needs to raise its profile in order to have any change of being taken 
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